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ANALYZING CHINA’S REJECTION OF THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA ARBITRATION 
Toward A New Era of International Law with Chinese 
Characteristics 
Isaac B. Kardon* 
At least since the 2008 global financial crisis, the People’s Republic 
of China (“PRC”) has been feeling its oats on the world stage.  After 
decades of “reform and opening” to ever-deeper integration into 
global affairs, China is now shaping the international system as 
much as that system is shaping China.  The “engagement” thesis—
variations on the idea that China’s sustained participation in 
interlocking Western-dominated institutions will produce a more 
liberal, compliant, and cooperative China (Economy and Oksenberg 
1999, Kent 2007, Johnston 2008)—is all but historical artifact. 
Now equipped with ample experience and outsized capacity, China 
can give as well as they get on the global stage.  Operating at 
impressive scale in economic, security, and diplomatic arenas, 
Chinese actors and organizations are now major players who drive 
the agenda.  Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to never seek leadership (绝不
当头) is no longer operative as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
publicly touts China’s role as a global leader with major ambitions.1  
PRC diplomats are no longer so reticent and have announced 
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1 See Xi Jinping, Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th CCP National 
Congress, XINHUA (Nov. 4, 2017, 06:07 PM ), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-
11/04/content_34115212.htm [https://perma.cc/H233-DKF3] (stating that all 
traditional Chinese communist thought must be altered to the new era of China). 
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China’s intent to serve as an active agent of change within the 
international order.2 
China’s influence is increasingly evident in the international legal 
arena.  The Fourth Plenum of the 18th National Party Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party exhorted Chinese diplomats and 
scholars to “vigorously participate in the formulation of 
international norms[,] . . . strengthen [China's] discourse power and 
influence in international legal affairs[,] . . . [and] use legal methods 
to safeguard [China's] sovereignty, security and development 
interests.”3  Indeed, many international legal regimes now embody 
not only Western, liberal norms and values (that the Chinese were 
supposed to internalize), but Chinese norms and values as well.  The 
lack of normativity in the Chinese pronouncements about 
international law and the overwhelming focus on its practical use as 
an instrument in service of policy and in defense of sovereignty are 
the most notable characteristics of China’s evolving approach to 
international law.  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) is one such regime where this new Chinese intent and 
capability are on vivid display.  PRC’s full-throated rejection of the 
arbitration brought by the Philippines under UNCLOS4 compulsory 
                                                 
2 See Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), Promote the Building of a Community of Common 
Destiny (Seriously Study, Propagate, and Implement the Spirit of the 19th CCP 
National Congress) (推动构建人类命运共同体(认真学习宣传贯彻党的十九大
精神)), RENMIN WANG (Nov. 19, 2017, 08:55 AM), 
http://hb.people.com.cn/n2/2017/1119/c192237-30938426.html 
[https://perma.cc/2CRF-HTTJ] (proclaiming that the western structure of 
international law is flawed and China is confident and capable of contributing to 
changes in the world). 
3 Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Decision concerning Some Major 
Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the County According to the 
law Forward (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定),RENMIN 
RIBAO (Oct. 29, 2014, 07:17 AM), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c64387-
25927606.html [https://perma.cc/YP4B-DFM7]. 
4 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf 
[http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf] 
(describing PRC’s reaction to the Philippines’ arbitration). 
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dispute resolution procedures in 2013 (“The South China Sea 
Arbitration”)5 marks a new high tide in China’s confidence that it 
can shape the global institutions it once only grudgingly endured.  
What influence will China wield on the development of the law of 
the sea regime?  PRC’s conduct and rhetoric surrounding this case 
provide some important insights. 
In refusing outright to participate in the arbitration, China showed 
itself willing and able to reject a vital component of a cornerstone 
treaty of the international legal order.  Beijing went further than 
simply ignoring the procedure by denying the standing and 
jurisdiction of the arbitral body to render binding judgments, 
vowing to never implement the final award rendered on July 12, 
2016, and attacking the motives and professional competence of the 
arbitral body itself.  With some irony, this is the same UNCLOS 
treaty China had ratified some twenty years prior in full exercise of 
its sovereignty; meanwhile, the supposed custodian of that 
international legal order, the United States, remains unlikely to 
ratify (despite enthusiastically backing the arbitration).  
Enforcement of judgments under international law is a tall order 
under any circumstance, and especially so when one of the parties 
has actively sought to delegitimize the procedure.  The field appears 
open for China. 
While some Chinese influence on legal processes will occur as a 
matter of course, this case demonstrates an active and disciplined 
PRC policy geared toward shaping the law of the sea, not destroying 
or ignoring it.  China has not rejected UNCLOS.  Instead, it is 
seeking to champion an UNCLOS with Chinese characteristics.  
PRC officials and a large cohort of domestic and international well-
wishers chastised the arbitral tribunal for what they held to be 
                                                 
5 See The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China, PCA CASE 
Repository Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2016), https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7 [https://perma.cc/M5A5-YCBE] 
(describing the previous dispute resolution procedures and how they affected the 
arbitration between the Philippines and PRC).  NB—this arbitration is often 
incorrectly described as a Permanent Court of Arbitration or “PCA” arbitration.  
The PCA in the Hague was only the registry for the proceedings, providing a 
venue, clerks, and administrative support.  The claim was brought under Annex 
VII of UNCLOS III, and relies on jurisdiction specific to that treaty. 
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inappropriate reach into a thicket of issues revolving around China’s 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea.  Their core arguments?  
UNCLOS does not regulate the issues under dispute; international 
law itself does not bear on matters of Chinese sovereignty.  If 
international law is deemed insufficient to solve these problems, 
what exactly is the alternative China is proposing?  How and why 
did China go about rejecting the arbitration?  What are the legal and 
political consequences of this action for China, for UNCLOS, for 
international dispute resolution, and for international law? 
This essay addresses those questions in four stages, analyzing (I) 
China’s pre-arbitration positions on UNCLOS, focusing on its 
compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms, (II) China’s campaign 
against the arbitration while it was underway from 2013 to 2016, 
and (III) China’s reactions to the final arbitral award.  Finally, I 
conclude with a provisional assessment of (IV) how China’s 
rejection of the arbitration has influenced regional politics and the 
law of the sea regime.  The South China Sea arbitration is destined 
to be a seminal case in our reckoning with a risen China’s 
relationship to international law.  Taking careful stock at present, 
the implications are troubling for the coherence, uniformity, and 
legitimacy of the international legal system. 
I. China’s Pre-Arbitral Stance on UNCLOS & Third-Party 
Dispute Resolution 
UNCLOS III was the PRC’s first major multilateral treaty as a 
member of the United Nations.  Prior to that, China’s official and 
practical stance toward such treaties (including the first UNCLOS 
treaty in 1958)6 was outright contempt, based in post-colonial 
                                                 
6 See Shen Weiliang, PRC Representative to the UN Seabed Committee, XINHUA 
WEEKLY, 18 (Apr. 1, 1973) (stating this first multilateral effort to codify the 
customary law of the sea concluded with the four 1958 Geneva Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea (i.e., UNCLOS I).  The People’s Republic of China did not 
participate and denounced UNCLOS I as “fundamentally in the interests of the 
superpowers in pursuing maritime hegemony and not to the advantage of the large 
numbers of developing countries in their just struggle to defend their sovereignty 
and national economic interests.”) (Shen Weiliang, PRC Representative to the UN 
Seabed Committee, Xinhua Weekly (March 18, 1973)).  For convenience, this 
essay will refer to UNCLOS III as “UNCLOS” unless specification is required. 
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nationalism and a distinctive strain of Marxism-Leninism.7  Until 
China’s reform and opening, international law was regarded as an 
unwelcome foreign import, forced upon China in the form of an 
“Unequal Treaty System” through a series of humiliating defeats in 
the long nineteenth century.  The history of extraterritoriality and 
other insults imposed upon China through the Western practice of 
treaty-making occupies a prominent role in the national psyche.8 
Whatever the impact of these bitter, early experiences on the 
Chinese rhetoric on the subject, PRC practice shows an evolutionary 
change toward accepting and contributing to international law.  
PRC’s volte face on the acceptability of such treaties is a 
remarkable shift, and nowhere more evident than in the law of the 
sea.  After participating energetically throughout the long UNCLOS 
negotiations (1973-1982), ratifying it in 1996, and steadily 
promulgating domestic legislation based largely on the treaty’s 
text,9 China’s relationship with UNCLOS appeared, on its face, like 
a success story for the engagement doctrine.  China was a member 
in good standing of a major international legal regime, and it 
seemed to be gradually internalizing its norms into its domestic law 
and practice. 
                                                 
7 See JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY (1974) (explaining PRC’s 
attitudes toward international law); see also Jacques DeLisle, China's Approach 
to International Law: A Historical Perspective, Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting, 94 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 267, 267-75 (2000) (exploring PRC’s attitude 
toward international law across history). 
8 Wang Jianlang (王建朗), The Record of Abolishing All Unequal Treaties in 
China (中国废除不平等条约的历程)(Zhongguo Feichu bu Pingdeng Tiaoyue de 
Licheng) (2000); Nanchang: Jianxi People’s Press (江西人民出版社), 2000); Lin 
Quan, ed., Sources on the Relinquishment of the Unequal Treaties during the War 
Resistance Period（抗战期间废除不平等条约史料)(Kangzhan Qijian Feichu bu 
Pingdeng Tiaoyue Shiliao) (Period (抗战时期废除不平等条约史料) (Taibei: 
Zhengzhong shuju, 1984). 
9 See Isaac Kardon, China’s Maritime Interests and the Law of the Sea: 
Domesticating Public International Law, in 12 CHINA’S SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW 
REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING 179 (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds., New 
York: Routledge, 2016) (explaining China’s law reforms relating to international 
law). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
6 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13 
 
Closer inquiry, however, demonstrates that PRC never internalized 
core norms essential to the treaty’s functionality.  Among them, two 
stand out as most relevant to this arbitration.  First, China does not 
accept that the rights and jurisdiction codified in UNCLOS III 
should extinguish or supersede rights and jurisdiction based on other 
sources.  In this case, China bases its claims to some 80% of the 
water space of the South China Sea upon “historical rights” that it 
refuses to define.  Second, China purports to exclude from 
compulsory dispute resolution some of the central issues for which 
that mechanism was designed.  Here, the Chinese demand bilateral 
diplomatic “negotiation and consultation” instead of third-party 
dispute-resolution prescribed in the Convention. 
In both instances, addressed in detail below, China reconciles 
inconvenient parts of UNCLOS with PRC policy through tortured 
interpretations of the treaty.  This mode of interpretation treats 
UNCLOS as fundamentally indeterminate and far from 
comprehensive.  In so doing, China’s advocates grant a wide berth 
to extravagant PRC claims to rights and jurisdiction not 
contemplated by the other parties to the Convention.  
Correspondingly, China’s stance on compulsory dispute resolution 
effectively denies the authority of the international community to 
adjudicate or otherwise restrict those unique claims.  This section 
analyzes each of these issues to establish a “baseline” description of 
China’s position from which to assess PRC’s subsequent actions 
surrounding the arbitration. 
China’s “Historical Rights” and Other Excessive Claims in the 
South China Sea 
PRC was willing to ratify UNCLOS III despite several clear 
disadvantages posed by the new treaty.  The final text had to be 
accepted as a “package deal,”10 meaning any state seeking the rights 
and jurisdiction conferred by the treaty took on all of the 
corresponding obligations.  Chinese policymakers understood 
                                                 
10 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 309 (Dec.10, 1982), 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (whereas some treaties allow parties to issue “reservations” 
that exempt them from one or more elements of the treaty, Article 309 of 
UNCLOS categorically denies this right).  
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clearly and in advance that certain “contradictions” between the 
clear black letters of the treaty and the broad, undefined nature of 
China’s maritime claims would inevitably cause some friction.11  
Yet PRC has never relinquished its extra-UNCLOS claims, and has, 
in fact, augmented them since ratifying.12  This process is possible 
because China’s domestic legal institutions do not necessarily bind 
the state to its international legal obligations.  Lax and under-
institutionalized legal rules permit ad hoc and opportunistic 
interpretations to prevail where international law comes into conflict 
with policy.13 
The PRC’s “excessive claims”14 are most evident in the South 
China Sea.  Among them are (1) straight baselines around all PRC-
claimed territory, regardless of whether they satisfy the 
requirements of Article 7;15 (2) archipelagic baselines drawn around 
the Paracel Islands (and by inference, the Spratly Islands), which are 
entitled at most to individual sets of baselines around each feature; 
(3) a host of restrictions on navigation (notably, on innocent passage 
through territorial seas and military activities in EEZs); and finally, 
(4) the notorious “nine-dashed line” map that represents some form 
                                                 
11 See Song Yann-Huei & Zou Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China 
and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges 
for the United States, 31 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 303, 308-09 (2000) (discussing 
why the Vice-Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing thought PRC should ratify UNCLOS.  
Addressing the Standing Committee of the Eighth PRC National People’s 
Congress shortly before the ratification, he listed four pros and four cons to 
joining the convention, arguing that the former outweighed the latter). 
12 See Kardon, supra note 9 (discussing PRC’s ambitious domestic legal efforts to 
augment its maritime rights, which would be seen as unlawful by any reasonable 
interpretation of UNCLOS). 
13 See Xue Hanqin & Jin Qian, International Treaties in the Chinese Domestic 
Legal System, 8.2. CHINESE J. INT’L L. 299, 300 (2009) (discussing the loophole 
in Chinese Constitution and basic laws that “do not contain any provision on the 
legal status of international treaties and their hierarchy in the domestic legal 
system”).  
14 See J. ASHLEY ROACH, ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (3rd 
ed. 2012) (offering the comprehensive, if U.S.-determined, accounting of which 
maritime claims do not comport with the law of the sea and why). 
15 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 7.1 (Dec.10, 1982), 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (specifying limited conditions under which straight baselines 
may be drawn, namely “where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if 
there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”). 
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of sovereignty and “historic rights” claim to most of the South 
China Sea.16  While there are other ways to characterize PRC’s 
claims, this minimal accounting establishes that there are multiple 
elements of Chinese interpretation and application of the law of the 
sea that are likely to come into conflict with that of other states. 
Image 1: China’s “Nine-Dashed Line”17 as submitted to the UN 
                                                 
16 See Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: 
History, Status and Implications, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 98, 108 (Beijing: Haiyang, 
2014) (offering the most careful and comprehensive Chinese accounting for how 
this claim, however defined, might entitle the PRC to some maritime rights not 
included in UNCLOS). 
17 See “Note Verbale,” from People’s Republic of China, “Note Verbale,” 
submitted to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_
vnm.pdf [https://perma.cc/96UH-6B39] (stating China’s position of indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/1
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That nine-dashed line claim is the most easily recognizable (see 
Image 1 above) and consequential of the PRC’s various claims, and 
one that is plainly at odds with some basic norms of the Convention.  
For one, the treaty expressly establishes a geographic basis for 
maritime entitlements.  All maritime rights and jurisdiction 
conferred under the Convention (which is framed as a 
comprehensive “constitution for the world’s oceans”) are a function 
of proximity to sovereign land territory (la terre domine la mer).  
Any historical claim not based on geography is in theory superseded 
by an agreed geographic system for distributing rights to coastal 
states.  Thus, certain of China’s claims to maritime space on the 
basis of some historical usage contradict the basic intent and 
purposes of UNCLOS III—and especially the EEZ regime. 
In effect, the nine-dashed line deprives all of the other coastal states 
in the South China Sea of EEZ resource rights and jurisdiction.  
Although there is no domestic legislation establishing the basis of 
this claim, PRC’s 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Continental Shelf creates the statutory possibility for a “historical 
rights” claim in stating that “the provisions in this Law shall not 
affect the rights that PRC has been enjoying ever since the past.”18  
This indeterminate, historical argument for, in effect, exempting 
itself from the EEZ regime looms large in China’s efforts to deny 
the authority of the UNCLOS tribunal to render judgment on 
China’s claims.  The Philippines launched its suit against China in 
large part to put the question of the legality of that line to the 
judgment of the international community. 
Downplaying the Role of Third-Party Dispute Resolution 
China maintains a principled opposition to mandatory dispute 
resolution procedures.  PRC legal scholars have been asserting as 
much since at least the early 1960s: where sovereignty is 
implicated, “it is never possible to seek a settlement from any 
                                                 
18 Zhuanshu Jingjiqu he Dalujia Fa (专属经济区和大陆架法专属经济区与大陆
架法) [Law of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., ( effective June 26, 1998), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_1383573.htm [https://perma.cc/RG3K-AGQJ]. 
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form of international arbitration.”19  This rejection emerges from 
some combination of opportunism, weak domestic legal 
institutions, and the bitter legacy of extraterritoriality and other 
infringements on Chinese sovereignty.  While blanket opposition 
to international arbitration is no longer in effect (e.g., China’s 
growing and effective use of the WTO arbitration system),20 the 
vestiges of that hostile attitude remain in the PRC’s current 
practice.  Given the tacit invitation to arbitrate manifested in 
China’s excessive maritime claims, and their plausible bearing on 
sovereignty, it is not at all surprising that PRC would seek to 
exclude itself from the Philippines’ suit. 
In respect of the law of the sea, China made its views on this issue 
known during the negotiations of the Conference.  The leading 
international legal scholar on the Chinese delegation, Wang Tieya, 
made his only official comment to the plenary group on the 
subject of dispute resolution, stating that a compulsory and 
binding dispute resolution procedure is a non-starter.21  This 
opposition meant that the PRC did not entirely embrace the 
“package deal” of UNCLOS when it ratified in 1996.  Instead, by 
including several reservations in its signing statement, China 
signaled that it would not fully accept the dispute resolution 
procedures of Part XV.  Among those reservations, China 
announced that it “will effect, through consultations” resolution 
on maritime boundary issues.22  In so doing, it acted in breach of 
the clear prohibition on excluding any part of the Convention 
                                                 
19 Gao Yuanping, International Dispute Settlement, in GUOJI FA (国际法) 
[International Law] 611-12, (Wang Tieya ed., Beijing: Law Press, 1995). 
20 Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How it Took on the U.S. at the 
WTO, 1 U. OF ILLINOIS L. REV. 115, 132 (Jan. 2018). 
21 See UNCLOS III Official Documents, A/CONF.62/SR.112 (listing Wang 
Tieya’s comment). 
22 See United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
Declarations and Statements (1996), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm
#China Upon ratification [https://perma.cc/P6VH-739N] (NB—in 2006, China 
opted to exempt itself from certain forms of compulsory dispute resolution—
including boundary delimitation—by evoking Article 298.  Had PRC exercised 
this possibility in 1996 upon ratification, there would have been no obvious 
breach of Article 309). 
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(Article 309), signaling an a la carte approach to interpreting and 
applying the treaty’s rules. 
This emphasis on dialogue and consultation in lieu of formal 
dispute resolution is a central component of PRC’s modern 
practice of international law.  In 2013, PRC’s UN Ambassador to 
the UNGA Sixth Committee (on legal affairs) offered the official 
statement, “[t]he Chinese government actively upholds peaceful 
settlement of disputes, and proposes to settle international disputes 
properly through negotiation, dialogue and consultation.”23  This 
statement is significant for its omission of “arbitration and judicial 
settlement,” listed in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter24 as 
available options for international dispute resolution.  Those 
procedures are by no means mandatory, but it is notable that 
China has a priori excluded them from consideration in dealing 
with international disputes.25  A jealous regard for sovereign 
prerogatives is a key principle in PRC practice of international 
law.  
These two positions—maintaining excessive, undefined claims 
and excluding mandatory arbitration that might limit them—
prefigure the PRC’s reaction to the Philippines’ arbitration.  They 
reflect certain national interests that Beijing is unwilling to 
subordinate to international law, a posture not uncommon among 
great powers.26  Further, and more specific to the Chinese case, 
they represent a principled rejection of authoritative decisions 
                                                 
23 H.E. Ambassador Wang Min, From Chinese Mission to the United Nations, 
Address Before the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t108
7085.shtml [https://perma.cc/MK9Y-NPWY]. 
24 U.N. Charter art. 33, ¶1, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/ 
[https://perma.cc/JQ2C-Y764]. 
25 Julian Ku, China’s Definition of the “Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes” Leaves Out International Adjudication, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 15, 2013, 
12:53 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/10/15/obligation-seek-peaceful-settlement-
international-disputes-include-international-adjudication/ 
[https://perma.cc/7DMD-2CXZ]. 
26 See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International 
Law, 52. HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2011) (refuting the American exceptionalism 
underlying the American stance toward international law by comparing the case 
of China, the European Nation, and the United States). 
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rendered outside of Beijing’s sovereign control.  Whatever the 
many causes of this acute preoccupation with sovereignty, it has 
distinct consequences for the effectiveness of international legal 
regimes largely predicated on making certain binding demands of 
sovereign states. 
The overwhelming imperative for the Chinese party-state to 
exercise control manifests in the sequence of official and semi-
official reactions to the South China Sea Arbitration.  At an early 
stage, PRC statements sought to diminish the importance of the 
law of the sea as the sole authoritative source of law, 
subordinating it to historical factors as well as other bodies of law.  
Following a principled commitment to “inviolable Chinese 
sovereignty” that brooks no meaningful penetration by 
international law, China reserved the right to interpret the rules 
according to its domestic priorities, with only minimal regard for 
international consequences. 
II. Struggling Against an “Illegitimate” Arbitration 
In January of 2013, the Republic of the Philippines Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs filed a Statement and Notification of Claim under 
Article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS III.27  The Philippines 
opted to pursue UNCLOS arbitration as a final option after the 
PRC had seized the Scarborough Shoal in the spring of 2012.  In 
evicting Philippine fishermen and law enforcement from a 
disputed feature in the South China Sea that both states had 
tenuously shared for decades, China catalyzed another round of a 
vain international frenzy over its “assertiveness.”28  U.S. efforts to 
                                                 
27  REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOTIFICATION 
OF STATEMENT AND CLAIM. NO. 13-0211 (2013), http://www.philippineembassy-
usa.org/uploads/pdfs/embassy/2013/2013-0122-
Notification%20and%20Statement%20of%20Claim%20on%20West%20Philippi
ne%20Sea.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6C3-M2T8]. 
28 This “assertiveness” trope began in 2009 and has continued through the present.  
Several analysts weighed in on the degree to which it was properly labeled, 
though all agree that the Scarborough Shoal incident could not be considered 
otherwise.  See Michael Swaine & Taylor Fravel, China’s Assertive Behavior—
Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” Periphery, 35 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 
(2011), http://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-assertive-behavior-part-two-
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mediate and stand down the Chinese at Scarborough in the spring 
of 2012 were ineffectual, as were bilateral Sino-Philippines 
efforts to deescalate and return to the status quo ante.29  Chinese 
law enforcement vessels remained at the shoal and excluded the 
once-routine operation of Philippine fishing vessels in around the 
shoal.  This failure, compounded by decades of incremental 
Chinese gains at their expense, led the Philippine leadership to 
launch proceedings under the compulsory arbitration provisions 
of UNCLOS—this despite no reasonable expectation China 
would willingly comply. 
Still, as a party to the Convention, China was and remains legally 
bound to honor the arbitral award.  Because consent for 
compulsory arbitration was granted in ratification, the mechanism 
established in UNCLOS Part XV does not require both parties to 
appear before the tribunal for its decision to be final and 
binding.30  Despite some of the PRC’s objections to the 
Philippines’ standing and the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the power to 
determine legal obligation plainly lies with the UNCLOS body 
                                                                                                               
maritime-periphery [https://perma.cc/5YJK-LEX9] (assessing China’s maritime 
policy in terms of how assertive PRC has become in resolving both disputed and 
undisputed maritime territories); Michael Yahuda, China’s New Assertiveness in 
the South China Sea, 22 J. CONTEMP. CHINA (ISSUE) 81, 446 (2013) (explaining 
China’s heightened nationalism and assertiveness in promoting its claims in South 
China Sea); Alastair Iain Johnston, How New and Assertive Is China’s New 
Assertiveness, 37 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 7 (2013) (critiquing the concept of 
Chinese diplomacy’s “new assertiveness” by evaluating seven recent cases where 
Chinese diplomacy shows consistent, or even moderate, reaction to international, 
diplomatic claims, except where maritime disputes are involved). 
29 MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INT’L STUDIES, COUNTERING 
COERCION IN MARITIME ASIA: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF GRAY ZONE 
DETERRENCE 95-123 (2017), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170505_GreenM_CounteringCoercionAsia_Web.pdf?OnoJXf
Wb4A5gw_n6G.8azgEd8zRIM4wq [https://perma.cc/8DJH-PEG6]. 
30 Article 296 establishes the binding and final nature of an award rendered under 
the compulsory dispute resolution procedures of UNCLOS III.  Part XV, Annex 
VII, Article 9 explicitly states that a default of appearance “shall not constitute a 
bar to the proceedings” while Article 11 in that section affirms an award’s 
finality. 
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that arbitrated the case.31  China immediately and forcefully 
rejected this obligation nonetheless, and presented its arguments 
to the court of public opinion rather than to the arbitrators. 
Two Arguments and One Prescription 
The thrust of Chinese statements throughout the three and a half 
years of the arbitral process was constant.  It can be distilled to 
two arguments and one prescription that flows from them.  The 
first argument is that the Philippines took China to arbitration 
solely as a political exercise to deny China’s rightful “maritime 
rights and interests” and “internationalize” the disputes.  China’s 
opposition, therefore, was undertaken to uphold the legal regime 
of the law of the sea against this alleged abuse.  Second, Chinese 
spokespeople argued that the Philippines’ complaints fell beyond 
the scope of the Convention or were ruled out as subjects of 
arbitration by the Convention itself.  They reasoned that a broader 
set of considerations—including general and customary 
international law as well as vague consideration of history—
rightly govern the disputes.  Of course, such factors cannot be 
adjudicated in an UNCLOS forum and therefore demand 
alternative modes of dispute resolution. 
These two arguments yield a policy prescription from Beijing 
about how to manage disputes: bilateral “dialogue and 
consultation” (对话协商).  Whereas any state can have recourse 
to international legal means at any time as an exercise of its 
sovereignty, China counseled the Philippines to forego this right 
and instead to pursue a diplomatic approach (despite 
disadvantages intrinsic to dealing directly with a far larger 
power).  This prescription broadcasts a signal to any other small 
state that might seek to punch above its weight in seeking legal 
remedy against China, negating any leverage international law 
may offer.32  China’s insistence on this approach tracks its general 
                                                 
31 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 288 (Dec. 10, 1982), 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (“In the event of a dispute as to whether a court or tribunal has 
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled my decision of that court or tribunal.”). 
32 As will be discussed in the concluding section, Vietnam is the proximate target 
of this signal.  The Vietnamese government submitted a Note Verbale and a 
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attitude on the highly limited nature of international law.  Any 
authoritative third-party judgment on its maritime claims is 
anathema to the PRC approach to these disputes.  Specifically, the 
determinate nature of an award would radically narrow the 
possibilities for China’s excessive claims.  Informed Chinese 
recognized that Beijing’s legal strategy is to precisely avoid any 
determination of the nature and scope of its claims, and thus to 
retain the maximum flexibility to conduct diplomacy.33 
The proceeding section examines PRC’s official statements over 
the course of the arbitration, as well as notable commentaries 
from Chinese and sympathetic foreign scholars.  The legal (or 
logical) validity of the claims from either side of the case is not 
under scrutiny.  Rather, the aim is to analyze China’s response, 
showing its attitude toward (and possible influence on) the 
international law of the sea. 
China Can Say “No No No No!” 
Within days of the Philippines’ Statement and Notification of 
Claim, PRC officially rejected the entire procedure with extreme 
prejudice.  The Philippines sought relief for fifteen alleged 
Chinese violations of its obligations under UNCLOS, ranging 
from the validity of China’s “historic rights” to lapsed 
seamanship and poor environmental stewardship.34  The 
Philippines’ claims had been crafted by skilled UNCLOS lawyers 
in the Philippines and Foley Hoag LLP, an experienced private 
law firm in Washington, D.C.  Their submissions scrupulously 
avoided treading on questions of territorial sovereignty and 
                                                                                                               
statement of interest in the case to the tribunal, requested official materials, and 
sent an official delegation to observe the proceedings.  See PCA, The South China 
Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), 
Judgment, P.C.A. No. 2013-9 (Oct. 29) (explaining Vietnam’s movements against 
China). 
33 Interviews by Author in Hainan, Beijing, and Shanghai (2014). 
34 After submission of the Notification and Statement of Claim, the arbitral body 
was formed, and formal procedures adopted.  The Philippines submitted a 
Memorial setting out fifteen submissions on which they sought relief.  See The 
South China Sea Arbitration, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. 
(providing a thorough recounting of all the stages of the process).  
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boundary delimitation, which would fall outside of the tribunal’s 
competence.  Instead, the submissions hinged on the question of 
maritime entitlements—that is, the type and extent of jurisdiction 
and rights that UNCLOS permits states to claim from the 
sovereign territory, not the status of the sovereign territory per se. 
Nonetheless, the Chinese riposte protested the underlying 
sovereignty issues: “[t]he key and root of the dispute over the 
South China Sea between China and the Philippines is territorial 
disputes”35 announced the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) on the day of the claim.  China did not abandon this 
premise that the arbitration implicated sovereignty claims 
throughout the nearly four years of hearings and deliberation held 
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague.36 
On February 19, the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
publicized a fixed legal and policy position on the matter in a Note 
Verbale to the Philippines.  That position summarized as “Four 
Nos:” (1) no acceptance, (2) no participation, (3) no recognition, 
and (4) no implementation (不接受, 不参, 不承认, 不执行).37  By 
several accounts from Chinese legal scholars, this outright refusal to 
honor any aspect of the procedure now underway was a knee-jerk 
reaction from central leadership.  Confronted with the prospect of 
legitimizing an arbitration likely to go poorly for China, the 
consensus view among the leadership in Beijing was to attack the 
legal process itself and punish the Philippines for its 
“insubordination.”38  China did not formally participate in any part 
                                                 
35 China Reiterates Islands Claim After Philippine UN Move (Jan. 23, 2013) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21163507 [https://perma.cc/FVS9-X3T2]. 
36 NB—The arbitration was not a “PCA arbitration,” despite the frequent citation 
as such in the press.  The PCA served as the registry for the arbitration, providing 
the venue, clerks, and administrative work necessary to conduct a complex 
international arbitration.  The legal force of the ruling, the process by which the 
arbitrators were selected, as well as the source of their jurisdiction are solely a 
product of UNCLOS (specifically Part XV, Section 2, which provides 
“Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions,” and Annex VII which 
details the default arbitration procedures). 
37 Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1014798.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/K56K-D9PL]. 
38 Interviews by Author in Hainan and Beijing (April–December 2014). 
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of the procedure.  It neglected to appoint an arbitrator, declined to 
argue on its own behalf, and failed to submit documents and 
evidence that might have disposed the arbitrators more favorably to 
its counterclaims.  However, China did mount a large-scale public 
relations campaign surrounding the arbitration, seeking support 
within the international community for its interpretation of 
UNCLOS and the role of international law in international disputes. 
China’s categorical rejection of the arbitration process is best 
captured in a “Position Paper” published by the MFA in 
December of 2014.39  The arguments put forward in the Position 
Paper were a composite of an all-hands-on-deck effort from 
lawyers and analysts throughout China’s highly integrated 
government and think-tank community.40  While it was not 
submitted directly to the arbitrators, the PRC published its 
statement not long before the deadline to officially submit 
materials in response to the Philippines claim.  It was ultimately 
considered officially by the tribunal as a plea and informed the 
decision to bifurcate the proceedings into separate jurisdiction and 
merits phases.41  In it, China’s diplomats offered three principal 
reasons that the arbitral tribunal should not find jurisdiction.  Each 
endeavors to confound the arbitral process by introducing novel 
elements of China’s claims and diplomatic history that do not 
admit of interpretation under the Convention. 
                                                 
39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper 
on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the 
Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GRG9-NYGL] [hereinafter Position Paper]. 
40 LOUIS B. SOHN & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA (2004).  The author attended fifteen separate workshops, conferences, and 
meetings concerning the arbitration during the period April–December 2014, in 
which experts (and non-experts) discussed the various components of the Chinese 
objection and “perfected” them in reports that were sent directly to MFA. 
41 The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, PCA Case 
2013-9, Procedural Order No. 4 (Apr. 21, 2015), In the Matter of an Arbitration 
before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted under Annex VII to the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“Convention”) (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1807 
[https://perma.cc/E334-WZDZ]. 
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Sovereignty is a non-starter.  The Position Paper’s first argument 
is that “[t]he essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is the 
territorial sovereignty over several maritime features in the South 
China Sea, which is beyond the scope of the Convention and does 
not concern the interpretation or application of the Convention.”42  
The Convention authorizes an arbitral body (there are several 
choices in Part XV and Annexes for how it is to be constituted) to 
rule on “interpretation and application” of the Convention as 
regards the case under consideration.  Because the Convention 
treats only matters maritime, the more fundamental questions of 
territorial sovereignty is obviously excluded from the jurisdiction 
of any arbitral body formed pursuant to the treaty. 
The Position Paper claims that the Philippines acted in bad faith, 
smuggling in a sovereignty dispute under the guise of questions of 
maritime entitlement.  “The Philippines,” the paper alleges, 
is well aware that a tribunal . . . of the Convention 
has no jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty 
disputes.  In an attempt to circumvent this 
jurisdictional hurdle and fabricate a basis for 
institution of arbitral proceedings, the Philippines 
has cunningly packaged its case in the present 
form . . . This contrived packaging, however, fails 
to conceal the very essence of the subject-matter 
of the arbitration, namely, the territorial 
sovereignty over certain maritime features in the 
South China Sea.43 
Recognizing that there is no explicit request for a decision on 
sovereignty, the PRC paper parses the Philippines’ claims against 
it, citing the impossibility of ruling on entitlements if the 
underlying sovereignty questions are undetermined.44 
China is arguably justified in recognizing that ultimately, virtually 
all questions of “interpretation and application” of the treaty rely 
on some determination of sovereignty.  Without sovereignty 
                                                 
42 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, supra note39. 
43 Id. at ¶14. 
44 Id. at ¶15. 
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prefiguring a claim, there is no possibility of maritime jurisdiction 
of any sort.  However, following this logic, the tribunal would 
lack the authority to make virtually any decision whatsoever—an 
obvious absurdity.  From the Chinese legal standpoint, however, 
there is nothing absurd about this.  “Whatever logic is to be 
followed, only after the extent of China’s territorial sovereignty in 
the South China Sea is determined can a decision be made on 
whether China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea have 
exceeded the extent allowed in the Convention.”45  This high bar 
for admissibility would preclude most use of compulsory dispute 
resolution, consistent with China’s stated preferences. 
By a way of reinforcing the claim that sovereignty is necessarily 
implicated, the Position Paper issued the PRC’s clearest statement 
to date about the nature of its sovereignty claims to the Spratly 
Islands.46  Among other clarifying effects, this statement confirms 
that China’s 2011 Note Verbale, which was addressed to Secretary 
General of the United Nations, intentionally referred to the Spratly 
Islands in the singular form. 47  China evidently considers them a 
geographic unity for the purposes of sovereign title and maritime 
entitlements. 48  The Position Paper denounces the Philippines 
specification of individual features occupied by China as “an 
attempt at denying China’s sovereignty over the Nansha [Spratly] 
Islands as a whole.”  This claim to the “islands as a whole,” or as 
a “dependent archipelago” in the words of one U.S. law of the sea 
specialist,49 is among the several creative efforts employed by 
Chinese lawyers and diplomats to confound the application of the 
                                                 
45 Id. at ¶10. 
 
47 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, 
Note Verbale, No. CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011). 
48 Among other clarifying effects, this statement confirms that China’s 2011 Note 
Verbale addressed to Secretary General of the United Nations intentionally 
referred to the Spratly Islands in the singular form; China evidently considers 
them a geographic unity for the purposes of sovereign title and maritime 
entitlements.  Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, Note Verbale, 
No. CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011). 
49 J. Ashley Roach, Dependent Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines: an 
Excessive Claim?, 49.3 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2018) (draft on file 
with author). 
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Convention to its claims.  In describing the features as an 
archipelago (群岛), or collection of intrinsically linked islands, 
PRC attempted to reconfigure the demands facing the arbitrators.  
Instead of ruling on the status of individual features, the tribunal 
would have to consider the whole cluster of hundreds of rocks, 
reefs, atolls, and sandbars controlled in part by China, Taiwan, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines before reaching any 
judgments.  Naturally, if this argument were to be admitted, 
judgment on anything concerning the Spratly Islands would be 
impossible in an UNCLOS court trying a bilateral claim. 
The Position Paper adduces an additional reason that sovereignty 
is implicated in the Philippines’ claim.  Namely, two of the 
Philippines submissions (numbers four and six) ask the tribunal to 
determine whether or not a given feature is in fact a naturally 
formed island under Article 121, or a “low-tide elevation,” which 
cannot be the subject of a sovereign title.  “Whether low-tide 
elevations can be appropriated as territory is in itself a question of 
territorial sovereignty, not a matter concerning the interpretation 
or application of the Convention.  The Convention is silent on this 
issue of appropriation.”50  Alongside the “archipelago” argument, 
this stands as another effort to confound the application of the 
treaty to the case at hand.  In this case, the Chinese appeal to gaps 
in general international law for making determinations about 
appropriation of low-tide elevations.51 
This line of reasoning regarding sovereignty rests on the two core 
arguments introduced above, namely that the Philippines abused 
international law to pursue a political agenda, and that they are 
asking an UNCLOS body to arbitrate a matter that falls beyond its 
competence.  The Position Paper enjoins the reader to consider 
that China has been unjustly maligned for breaches of its 
obligations.  Instead, it is “the Philippines [that] contravenes the 
general principles of international law and international 
jurisprudence on the settlement of international maritime 
                                                 
50 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶25. 
51 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶25 (citing Qatar v. Bahrain, ICJ 2001 and 
Nicaragua v. Columbia, ICJ 2012). 
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disputes.”52  This argumentation goes well beyond what would be 
necessary to establish a jurisdictional exception, and instead 
moves to reposition China as the champion of international law.  
This interpretation is developed at length throughout the Position 
Paper. 
The Philippines does not enjoy the right to bring a suit against 
China.  The second line of attack in the Position Paper is again 
directed at the Philippines’ supposed bad faith in launching the 
arbitration.  In this instance, the fault lies in the Philippines failure 
to satisfy China’s standards for diplomatic negotiation prior to 
pursuing arbitration.  “There exists an agreement between China 
and the Philippines to settle their disputes in the SCS through 
negotiations, and the Philippines is debarred from unilaterally 
initiating compulsory arbitration.”53  The notion of “unilateral” 
use of a compulsory mechanism betrays a basic disregard for the 
Philippines’ rights as a party to the multilateral treaty that 
established this mandatory procedure.  Nonetheless, China’s 
explicit position is that the Philippines is obliged to consult with 
China before undertaking a sovereign decision to launch an 
arbitration on the basis of agreements concluded outside of the 
treaty framework.  The crux of this claim is that UNCLOS is not 
the appropriate instrument for handling this dispute, and is, in fact, 
superseded by the record of Sino-Philippines diplomacy. 
In the Chinese interpretation, the Philippines had previously 
renounced its rights under the Convention over the course of 
several diplomatic agreements with China.  This process of 
renouncing its right to “unilaterally” seek a legal remedy began, 
according to PRC, with agreements following the first (unilateral) 
Chinese seizure of the Philippine-held territory in the Spratlys, at 
Mischief Reef in 1995.  Following this flare-up, the parties issued 
a joint statement in which they “agreed to abide by” certain norms 
“with a view to eventually negotiate a settlement of the bilateral 
disputes.”54  Citing chapter and verse of the nations’ subsequent 
and extensive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic intercourse 
                                                 
52 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶29. 
53 Position Paper, supra note 39 at Heading III. 
54 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶31. 
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over the past two decades, the Position Paper identifies a range of 
hortatory statements that “establish an obligation between the two 
countries”55 to resolve their disputes through “dialogue and 
consultation.”  PRC holds that these agreements, collectively, 
should constitute a bar on compulsory dispute resolution. 
One of the principal sources that China cites as evidence of the 
Philippines’s lack of grounds for launching the suit is the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC), which states in paragraph four that “[t]he Parties 
concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional 
disputes by peaceful means . . . through friendly consultations and 
negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned, in accordance 
with universally recognized principles of international law, 
including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”56  As 
the signatories well knew at the time, such hortatory statements 
were hardly binding—nor even specific enough to rule out all 
manner of adversarial action.  Ironically, China was a staunch 
opponent of the DOC being considered a binding legal 
instrument,57 yet cites it here as part of a diplomatic pattern that, 
in aggregate, constitutes a binding agreement. 
That such diplomatic statements should override treaty obligations 
can be explained by China’s position on the narrow effective 
scope of UNCLOS.  It shows a disregard for the difference 
between political statements of intent and legal contracts—at least 
where such a distinction puts China at a disadvantage.  In Chinese 
domestic law, this is indeed a distinction without a difference.  
PRC’s 1990 Law on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties 
(Treaty Law) does not distinguish between “treaties” and 
                                                 
55 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶38. 
56 ASEAN, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, 
http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-
china-sea-2 [https://perma.cc/4Y7G-NYWU]. 
57 “The existence of the U-shaped line may be one of the reasons why China has 
been reluctant to sign a legally binding code of conduct with the ASEAN 
countries,” notes an UNCLOS scholar typically supportive of Chinese claims.  
Zou Keyuan, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, 43 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT’L L. 18, 24 (2012).  
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“important agreements” nor provide a standard for “important.”58  
The determination of which agreements will count as “important” 
(and thus entail legal obligations on par with formal treaties) is 
left entirely to the PRC State Council, the executive cabinet of the 
Chinese state.  This statute authorizes the state to undertake ad 
hoc decisions about which agreements will count as legally 
binding.59  Where convenient, non-legal, non-binding joint press 
statements (like those cited in the Position Paper) may outweigh 
ratified treaties. 
A Chinese exemption under the Convention.  The Position Paper 
advances a final set of claims to further diminish the effective 
scope of UNCLOS.  “Even assuming, arguendo, that the subject-
matter of the arbitration were concerned with interpretation or 
application of the Convention, that subject-matter would still be 
an integral part of maritime delimitation and, having been 
excluded by the 2006 Declaration filed by China, could not be 
submitted for arbitration”.60  The “2006 Declaration” refers to 
China’s additional submission to its signing statement, taken 
pursuant to Article 298, that excludes certain categories of dispute 
from compulsory arbitration.61  Among those excluded categories 
is maritime boundary delimitation, which the Position Paper 
alleges is also necessarily implicated by the Philippines’ claim. 
                                                 
58 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dijie Tiaoyue Chengxu Fa (中华人民共和国缔
结条约程序法) [Law of the People's Republic of China on the Procedure of the 
Conclusion of Treaties] (art. 2, promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l 
People's Cong., effective Dec. 28, 
1990),  http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383893.htm 
[http://perma.cc/A7SY-2WES]. 
59 For example, PRC has determined that the series of bilateral communiques 
between the U.S. and China have achieved equal status to treaties, even though 
these agreements oblige China to accept a continued U.S.-Taiwan relationship, 
otherwise anathema to the Chinese Communist Party.  ZHONGGUO DA BAIKE 
QUANSHU: LAW (中国大百科全书：法学) [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHINA: LAW] 195 
(Encyclopedia of China Editorial Bd. ed., 1984). 
60 Position Paper, supra note 39 at Heading IV. 
61 U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declarations and 
Statements, China Upon ratification (Jun. 7, 1996), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7U8W-S9CZ]. 
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Again, however, the absurdity of making all possible linkages 
among the clearly interlinked elements of the law of the sea 
regime shines through.  Questions about one substantive issue in 
the law of the sea can be made to bear upon virtually any other 
substantive area, provided sufficient leeway to make logical 
connections.  If this logic were applied universally, no compulsory 
dispute resolution could exist because all questions would have 
vestigial elements of sovereignty or maritime boundary 
delimitation.  In arguing against jurisdiction on this count, PRC 
strikes another blow at the efficacy of the dispute resolution 
procedures in the Convention.  Further, it again alleges that the 
Philippines acted with bad-faith political motives “[t]o cover up 
the maritime delimitation nature of the China-Philippines dispute 
and to sidestep China’s 2006 declaration.”62  The “cover up,” as it 
were, is the act of smuggling certain discrete questions that have 
bearing on maritime delimitation such that “a so-called ‘legal 
interpretation’ on each of them”63 “would amount to a de facto 
maritime delimitation.”64  The Philippines’ submissions include 
issues that have been considered in previous, successful maritime 
boundary delimitations; ergo, the Paper reasons, the Philippines 
are simply seeking a backdoor to achieve maritime delimitation. 
The Position Paper further alleges political motives in the 
Philippines failure to consult with China in advance to discover 
whether the issues in dispute were, in China’s view, covered under 
its Article 298 declaration.  Without such diplomatic overtures, 
it could be well imagined that any of the disputes 
listed in article 298 may be submitted to the 
compulsory procedures under section 2 of Part 
XV simply by connecting them . . . with the 
question of interpretation or application of certain 
provisions of the Convention.  Should the above 
approach be deemed acceptable, the question 
would then arise as to whether the provisions of 
Article 298 could still retain any value, and 
whether there is any practical meaning left of the 
                                                 
62 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶65. 
63 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶65. 
64 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶69. 
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declarations so far filed by 35 States Parties under 
Article 298.65  
PRC thus positions itself as the defender of the Convention 
against abuses that, if taken to their logical extreme, would 
undermine the functioning of the treaty. 
China’s mode of championing the treaty, however, is largely to 
spare it from functioning at all in issues of any political import.  In 
concluding the Position Paper, the Chinese argued that the South 
China Sea issue “is compounded by complex historical 
background and sensitive political factors . . . China always 
maintains that the parties concerned shall seek proper ways and 
means of settlement through consultations and negotiations on the 
basis of respect for historical facts and international law.”66  This 
valedictory statement recaps the basic thrust of the Position Paper: 
sovereignty is too politically sensitive to legally adjudicate; 
UNCLOS has a narrow scope; and the only appropriate means of 
resolution runs through bilateral diplomacy with Beijing. 
Although it was not formally submitted, the arbitral tribunal 
elected to “treat the Position Paper and certain communications 
from China as constituting, in effect, a plea concerning 
jurisdiction.”67  Taken in sum, PRC objections in the Position 
Paper reflect long-standing positions and modes of interpretation 
on the law of the sea—even if they also appear cynically 
convenient in this case.  Especially where issues of sovereignty 
are implicated, we should expect China to reject all modes of 
third-party dispute resolution.  More significant and surprising, 
perhaps, are the various arguments intended to narrow the scope 
of substantive issues which may be arbitrated under the 
Convention.  If claims to jurisdiction and sovereign rights that rely 
on vague historical claims and appeals to “general international 
law” were to fall beyond the writ of the Convention, as argued in 
                                                 
65 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶74. 
66 Position Paper, supra note 39 at ¶92. 
67 The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Case No. 
2013-19, Arbitration Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506 [https://perma.cc/362B-
CYCS]. 
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the Chinese paper, the capacity of the treaty to regulate maritime 
claims and activities would be radically curtailed. 
Recruiting Support Among Chinese and Foreign Legal Experts 
Despite China’s principled rejection of the process, the arbitral 
tribunal explicitly considered the Chinese arguments about 
jurisdiction in its deliberations, electing to bifurcate its procedure 
into jurisdictional and merits awards.  In the October 2015 award 
on jurisdiction and admissibility, the arbitrators found jurisdiction 
over seven of the fifteen Philippine submissions, and withheld 
determination on jurisdiction for the remaining eight depending 
on consideration of the facts during the merits phase (and 
clarification of one submission deemed too general).  This 
decision guaranteed that an award on the merits was forthcoming 
and inspired a PRC-directed campaign to delegitimize the 
arbitration, the arbitrators, and the various parties purportedly 
conspiring against China. 
Given the high probability of an adverse award, the ensuing public 
relations campaign was swift and pointed.  A cottage industry of 
South China Sea arbitration law books and articles, a sudden 
flurry of masters and doctoral theses, and a lively conference 
circuit all emerged during this period.68  Each of the arguments in 
the December 2014 Position Paper found enthusiastic advocates 
throughout China’s commentariat and academy.  These took the 
form of ad hominem media attacks on the arbitrators,69 attempted 
ex parte contact with arbitrators to discourage them from 
                                                 
68 The author observed this directly, as he was conducting research in Hainan, 
Beijing, and Taipei in 2014-2015 and had the opportunity to conduct hundreds of 
interviews with many of the scholars and think-tankers engaged in study and 
advocacy surrounding the arbitration, attend some fifteen conferences on the 
subject, and both teach and audit several law classes on UNCLOS at Tsinghua 
University and Hainan University. 
69 For a summary of this campaign, see Liu Zhen, Questions of Neutrality: China 
Takes Aim at Judges in the South China Sea Case, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 
(Jul. 11, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-
defence/article/1988119/questions-neutrality-china-takes-aim-judges-south-china 
[https://perma.cc/KP9A-LMM8]. 
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unfavorable rulings,70 impugning the motives of personnel 
involved in the selection of arbitrators (articulated by a senior 
MFA official),71 and a spate of impassioned presentations at 
international law events denouncing the “wanton abuse of the law 
of the sea.”72 
This campaign achieved more than internal solidarity.  A detailed 
rebuttal to the SCS arbitration under the auspices of a Cambridge 
University legal scholar marketed these arguments to a 
sophisticated foreign audience.73  The essays in that volume set 
out several markers that reappear throughout the various 
commentaries supporting PRC during this period and provide 
some evidence of the tactics China employs to win converts to its 
mode of interpreting international law.  Other volumes assembled 
foreign law of the sea experts, some of whom made arguments not 
entirely along the lines of those endorsed by PRC officialdom, but 
whose imprimatur gave the appearance of a credible legal debate 
on whether or not the arbitration was indeed a lawful exercise.74  
The upshot of these commentaries was the establishment of a 
body of literature available to all interested that prescribes a far 
narrower scope for UNCLOS-related jurisdiction than the field 
                                                 
70 The Republic of the Philippines v. the People’s Republic of China, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility  
71 Liu Zhenmin (刘振民), Zhongguo Bujieshou Feilübin Suoti Nanhai 
Zhongcaian Wanquan Fuhe Guojifa (中国不接受菲律宾所提南海仲裁案完全
符合国际法) [China Does Not Accept that the Philippines’ Arbitration 
Completely Conforms to International Law], QIUSHI [QSTHEORY] (Jul. 3, 2016), 
http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-07/03/c_1119153268.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Z7EG-5XXF]; News Analysis: Shunji Yanai, Manipulator 
Behind Illegal South China Sea Arbitration, XINHUA (Jul. 17, 2016), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/17/c_135519215.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T5X9-F3QC]. 
72 Yee Sienho, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Annual 
Conference (Apr. 14, 2017) (meeting audio available at 
https://www.asil.org/resources/audio/2017-annual-meeting 
[https://perma.cc/R3D3-H8BW]).  
73 THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (Stefan Talmon 
& Bing Bing Jia eds., 2014). 
74 See e.g., ARBITRATION CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: PHILIPPINES 
VERSUS CHINA (Wu Shicun & Zou Keyuan eds., 2016) (featuring articles by 
Donald Rothwell, Ted McDorman, Robert Beckman, Sam Bateman, and other 
well-recognized scholars of law of the sea issues). 
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has typically recognized.  The intent was to place the Convention 
lower in the hierarchy of norms that bear on maritime order.  If 
“History” or general international law or customary international 
law could be positioned as superior to the UNCLOS treaty, then 
the impact of the inevitably unfavorable award might be 
diminished. 
The intensely political tenor of this campaign also lent credence to 
the proposition that the arbitration was entirely political, and that 
any decision that emerged from it was illegitimate.  In 
conversation, the author has been told that the Japanese are behind 
the case, that the U.S. State Department wrote the Philippines’ 
memorial to the tribunal, and that there is some vast conspiracy of 
Western states to use international law to discredit China’s 
sovereignty in the South China Sea.75  These non-scholarly views 
were widely circulated on several WeChat forums of Chinese 
academics and enthusiasts.76  While these venues hosted plenty of 
debate on just how illegal the arbitration was, only one set of 
arguments overtly critical of PRC laws garnered any publicity, 
delivered by a Chinese-born law professor working in Australia.77 
                                                 
75 Ji Mingkui(纪明葵), Nanhai Zhongcai Shi Xifang Daoyande Naoju (南海仲裁 
是西方导演的闹剧) [The ‘SCS Arbitration’ is a Western-sponsored Farce], 
QIUZU WANG [QSTHEORY] (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://www.qstheory.cn/international/2014-12/11/c_1113607463.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XMY7-NEAZ]. 
76 Wang Jiangyu (王江雨), Nanhai Zhongcaian: Guoji Zhengzhi, Guojifa Yu 
Guojia Liyi (南海仲裁案:国际政治, 国际法与国家利益) [The SCS Arbitration: 
International Politics, International Laws, and National Benefits], LIANHE 
ZAOBAO [UNION MORNING POST] (Dec. 22, 2015), 
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77 Ling Bing (凌兵) Weishenme Zhongguo Jujue Nanhai Zhongcai Yousun 
Zhongguode Quanyi? (为什么中国拒绝南海仲裁有损中国的权益?) [Why Has 
China’s Rejection of the South China Sea Arbitration Damaged China’s Rights 
and Interests?], ZHONGMEI YINXIANG [US-CHINA PERCEPTION MONITOR] (Dec. 
18, 2015), 
http://www.uscnpm.com/model_item.html?action=view&table=article&id=7961 
[https://perma.cc/H9HJ-3WZD].  These remarks were publicized by Julian Ku 
after the award in Julian Ku, The Leaf Nation: China’s Legal Scholars Are Less 
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With these arguments intact and circulating throughout the expert 
community, PRC diplomats began to recruit states to announce that 
they, too, did not accept the arbitration.  Presumably linking 
opposition to some consequence, China was able to solicit clear 
statements from five states that they opposed the ruling: 
Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Taiwan78, and Vanuatu.79  
This is not an overwhelming group, though in number it is 
comparable to those willing to directly and explicitly support the 
SCS arbitration: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the 
Philippines, the U.S., and Vietnam.  China’s MFA claimed that over 
sixty states had joined PRC’s cause in opposing the ruling, 
employing an unusual counting method that included states who 
merely expressed support for China’s principle of resolving disputes 
through consultation and dialogue.80  Commenting to reporters on 
this outpouring of purported support, an MFA spokesman 
maintained that international support for the Chinese position was 
itself a resounding affirmation of the rule of law.  PRC was 
defending the integrity of the system against those states (i.e., the 
Philippines) that “break rules and undermine international rule of 
law under the excuse of ostensibly ‘upholding the rule.’”81 
He added that this support also reflects “affirm[ation] that the 
sovereign disputes over relevant islands and reefs in the South 
                                                                                                               
Credible After the South China Sea Ruling, FOREIGN POLICY, (July 14, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/14/south-china-sea-lawyers-unclos-beijing-
legal-tribunal/ [https://perma.cc/4MVV-ZX9J]. 
78 Taiwan is not formally a state.  It also bears noting that Taiwan’s opposition 
came not because of Chinese efforts to discredit the award, but because Taiwan 
bristled at being excluded from observing the proceedings because it is not a 
member UNCLOS III because of PRC opposition.  Republic of China Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ROC Position on the South China Sea Arbitration (Jul. 12, 
2016), 
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=
5B5A9134709EB875 [https://perma.cc/ZYJ9-6UE3]. 
79 Greg Poling, Arbitration Support Tracker, Asia Mar. Transparency Initiative 
(June 16, 2016), https://amti.csis.org/arbitration-support-tracker/ 
[https://perma.cc/GZ9V-SSK5]. 
80 Lu Kang(陆慷), Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Regular Press Conference, 
P.R.C. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1
372136.shtml [https://perma.cc/K4NJ-DYQP]. 
81 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss2/1
2018]  31 
 
China Sea shall be properly resolved through friendly negotiation by 
parties directly concerned on the basis of respecting historical facts 
and international law.”82  This construction—the juxtaposition of 
international law and history—is of paramount importance to a full 
understanding of the Chinese view on the appropriate scope and 
reach of international legal norms. 
UNCLOS, from this perspective, is not the exclusive source of law 
on maritime issues.  Chinese interlocutors frequently point to the 
customary international law of territorial acquisition as a basis for 
their claims to sovereignty over South China Sea features.  China’s 
acquisitive actions predate the Convention itself, and therefore 
should not be regulated by it under a doctrine of “intertemporal law” 
(时际法).83  Corollary to this argument is the claim that there are 
different bodies of law that are equally if not more valid, and that 
must be balanced against UNCLOS rules.84  Following this 
reasoning, the questions of China’s “historical” rights to resources 
or jurisdiction in the SCS flow from an entirely different legal 
regime.85  The reams of tendentious historical “research” 
commissioned by PRC institutions during this period all point 
unwaveringly in this direction.  In official communications, PRC 
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案初步裁决评析) [Analysis of the Initial Award in the South China Sea 
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1–32 (2014). 
85 Hong Nong, Post-Arbitration South China Sea: China’s Legal Policy Options 
and Future Prospects, (Apr. 2017), 
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cites its “abundant historical and legal evidence”86 and publishes it 
frequently in official media and academic presses.87 
The commentary from PRC officials, academics, and like-minded 
voices collectively advanced the two broader arguments detailed 
above: (1) that the arbitration is a political exercise designed to 
subvert China’s sovereignty, and therefore China’s actions 
actually uphold the legal order of the oceans; and (2) that the 
Convention is too narrow to rule on questions of sovereignty and 
history.  Taken together, these yield the preferred Chinese 
solution: sideline UNCLOS and engage in bilateral consultation 
and dialogue.  Following the publication of the award, this 
prescription has come to dominate Chinese diplomacy and 
scholarship on the subject of the South China Sea. 
III: “A Piece of Waste Paper” 
The July 12, 2016 publication of the tribunal’s final “Award”88 
was breathtaking in scope and ambition, far surpassing the 
expectations of the law of the sea community.  Not only did the 
tribunal find its way to jurisdiction on all of the outstanding 
Philippines’s claims, but it also went much further than expected 
in pronouncing China’s “nine-dashed line” invalid as a claim to 
resource rights.  Additionally, the tribunal established a 
demanding new test for determining the status of islands; applying 
it to the Spratlys, they determined that none of the features—not 
those occupied by China nor those of any other claimant—were 
sufficient to warrant status as a full island entitled to an EEZ and 
continental shelf.  Two of the seven PRC-occupied features in the 
Spratlys were even determined to be low-tide elevations (Subi and 
                                                 
86 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale, 
CML/8/2011 (Apr. 14, 2011), available from DOALOS at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_201
1_re_phl_e.pdf []. 
87 Pounding the table at academic and think-tank conferences on this count is de 
rigueur. 
88 See generally Republic of the Phil. v. China., No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20-
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Mischief Reefs), and thus not lawfully subject to a claim of 
sovereignty—despite impressive Chinese facilities constructed 
atop those submerged features. 
Immediately after the award was released, the MFA published a 
statement on the award, recapping their prior objections and 
pronouncing the PRC policy on the matter.  It stated that “PRC 
solemnly declares that the award is null and void and has no 
binding force,” and consequently, “China neither accepts nor 
recognizes it.”89  In comments to the press, MFA Vice-Minister 
Liu Zhenmin pronounced the Award as “just a piece of waste 
paper.”90  PRC officials largely omitted comment on the matter as 
the Philippines’s new administration vowed not to seek 
enforcement and parroted Liu’s “piece of [waste] paper” comment 
as justification for their disinterest in discussing the award.91  
PRC’s subsequent practice and diplomacy offer some indications 
of the ways in which China aims to shape the law of the sea 
regime moving forward.  After a brief summary of the Award, this 
section turns to China’s reactions and what they reveal about the 
characteristics of Chinese influence on UNCLOS. 
The Tribunal’s Ambitious Award 
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A key finding about the status of islands in the South China Sea 
enabled the tribunal to decide on all of the other issues.  Namely, 
in finding that none of the features in the South China Sea can be 
considered “islands” under the definition offered in the 
Convention, the arbitrators cleared the central obstruction to 
ruling on the Philippines’s other submissions.  En route to this 
decision, the arbitrators wrestled with the indeterminacy of the 
rule, laid out in the black letters of Article 121(3), which state, 
“[r]ocks[,] which cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own[,] shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf.”92  Because these terms are not defined 
elsewhere in the treaty, nor dealt with in any depth in 
jurisprudence, the arbitrators go to comical lengths to define each 
of the scarce words in this definition, and settle on a highly 
rigorous test for determining whether a feature can be considered 
a full-fledged island.93  None of the features under consideration 
meet these stringent requirements, which hinge on a 
demonstrated, empirical record of human habitation and economic 
use.94 
Because China had been exercising its jurisdiction in the form of 
maritime law enforcement in areas surrounding these features that 
are not entitled to EEZ rights, this decision on the status of islands 
clears the way for a determination that those PRC practices are 
unlawful.  The lack of additional entitlements allowed the tribunal 
to remain agnostic about sovereignty claims while finding that 
China’s claims to exclusive or non-exclusive rights to resources 
(primarily fish and hydrocarbons) were illegal in areas beyond the 
territorial seas of the disputed features.  Perhaps more damaging, 
several of the features were determined to be incapable of 
sovereign possession because they lay under water at high tide 
and thus are properly classified as “low-tide elevations” (LTEs).  
This determination is especially problematic in the case of the 
                                                 
92 Law of the Sea Convention art. 121(3), Dec. 10, 1982, UNCLOS III. 
93 Republic of the Phil. v. China., No. 2013-19, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), 
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poetically-justly-named “Mischief Reef,” which the award 
determined to be a low-tide elevation that lies on the continental 
shelf—and thus within the jurisdiction—of the Philippines.  The 
presence of a large artificial island on this feature, constructed by 
PRC, further complicates this mischievous reef’s status. 
Several other elements of the award make somewhat more diffuse 
demands on China, preemptively disqualifying several policies or 
practices that PRC might see fit to undertake in the South China 
Sea.  Most significant among them is the decision that the “nine-
dashed line” is not a valid claim to maritime rights.  The 
arbitrators concluded that “China’s claims to historic rights, or 
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime 
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of 
the ‘nine-dashed line’ are contrary to the Convention and without 
lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and 
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the 
Convention.”95  Read alongside the ruling on entitlements, this 
decision means that China’s lawful rights and jurisdiction in the 
South China Sea can be no more than twelve nautical miles from 
any of the features, pending settlement on their underlying 
sovereignty. 
The Award goes even further in preemptively ruling out any 
possible Chinese efforts to claim broader entitlements, expressly 
denying the possibility of establishing “archipelagic baselines” 
around groups of islands in the SCS, which might collectively rate 
a status as a full-fledged island.  Reading the black letters of the 
Convention in Article 47, the Award makes a special point of 
denying the legality of any kind of archipelagic claim from PRC 
because it is not an archipelagic state as defined in Article 46.96  
While no question was posed by the Philippines to this effect, the 
tribunal here is struggling to head off efforts by China to subvert 
the ruling by pursuing claims that are not expressly outlawed. 
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Another preemptive move in the Award concerns China’s much-
publicized artificial islands, replete with fighter and bomber 
aircraft-capable runways, hardened defensive facilities, weapons 
emplacements, and radar.97  The Philippines sought relief on the 
basis of extensive environmental damage wrought by construction 
of these islands.  The tribunal heard substantial expert testimony 
about the environmental damage caused by PRC dredging and 
reclamation efforts in building up these non-islands, and found 
PRC in breach of its obligations to protect and conserve the 
natural environment, as established in UNCLOS.  Further 
construction has been in direct contravention of the award.98 
A further set of decisions concerns unsafe navigational practices 
by Chinese maritime law enforcement and fishing vessels, 
violations of UNCLOS and another set of international standards 
referenced in UNCLOS, the 1972 Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).  The 
China Coast Guard has periodically engaged in risky seamanship, 
including ramming, near-misses, use of water cannons, and so on.  
Further action in this vein will be in breach of the award.  
China’s Response: So What? 
The award’s unequivocal demands on PRC of course beg the 
question “so what?”  After all, PRC had spent the better part of 
four years announcing its total rejection for the arbitration, 
asserting that they would not implement the award even if it were 
to turn out favorably.  No enforcement mechanisms exist in 
UNCLOS, and the Philippines would be hard-pressed to insist on 
full implementation even if their government were so inclined.  
However, the tremendous volume of PRC diplomatic energy 
expended throughout the procedure is a clear indication that 
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China’s leadership perceived some significant costs associated 
with the arbitration.  Their response to the award demonstrates 
more than just defiance of the award; it is a bid to shape the future 
“interpretation and application” of the law of the sea in ways that 
permit far greater leeway for sovereign states to define their own 
rights and jurisdiction. 
The immediate response from the MFA, released on the day of the 
award, reprises many of the specific objections to the Philippines 
case, and then closes with a single paragraph that encapsulates 
each of the arguments analyzed above: 
The Chinese government reiterates that, regarding 
territorial [sovereignty] issues and maritime 
delimitation disputes, China does not accept any 
means of third party dispute settlement or any 
solution imposed on China.  The Chinese 
government will continue to abide by 
international law and basic norms governing 
international relations as enshrined in the Charter 
of the United Nations, including the principles of 
respecting state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
continue to work with states directly concerned to 
resolve the relevant disputes in the South China 
Sea through negotiations and consultations on the 
basis of respecting historical facts and in 
accordance with international law, so as to 
maintain peace and stability in the South China 
Sea.99 
This statement epitomizes China’s dogmatic emphasis on the 
inviolability of its sovereignty and consequent inadmissibility of 
third-party decisions without its consent.  It highlights the political 
instrumentality of the Philippines’s use of international law.  It 
mounts vague appeals to indeterminate principles rather than 
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concrete rules.  Finally, it asserts that solutions can be reached only 
by “respecting historical facts and in accordance with international 
law,”100 tacitly subjugating norms of international law to a Chinese 
interpretation of history.  China’s consistency on these principles 
warrants close attention, and foreshadows their subsequent practice. 
The following day, July 13, 2016, the PRC State Council released 
a White Paper entitled “China Adheres to the Position of Settling 
Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and 
the Philippines in the South China Sea.”101  Liu Zhenmin spoke on 
the release of the White Paper, further denigrating the award: 
“[i]ts composition is obviously problematic, and it has no 
representativeness, authority nor credibility and cannot represent 
international law at all.  Therefore, its award is surely illegal and 
invalid.”102  This senior official’s statement rehashes known 
objections to the award and introduces a document that began a 
process of posing a Chinese alternative to the UNCLOS dispute 
resolution process.  This authoritative White Paper on the subject 
of the South China Sea is the first of its kind and represents the 
state of the art in Beijing’s thinking about its claims in these 
disputed waters.  Importantly for our efforts to understand China’s 
relationship with international law, it indicates some of the key 
lines of effort in China’s efforts to shape the law of the sea 
regime. 
Recognizing the inconvenience of a determinate ruling against 
China’s central claim, the White Paper goes a considerable way 
towards decoupling the nine-dashed line from the substance of 
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Chinese claims to extraordinary rights and jurisdiction throughout 
the South China Sea.  Despite its continued prominence on PRC 
maps (and, inferentially, its geographic relevance to ongoing PRC 
law enforcement and economic activities throughout the disputed 
region), the nine-dashed line was not presented as the central 
element of Chinese claims to rights and jurisdiction.  By 
separately listing these entitlement claims, the “historic rights” 
claim, and the “nine-dashed line” claim, China is implicitly 
acknowledging the legal weaknesses of the nine-dashed line—
predictably confirmed by the Award—and charting a new course 
to redefine the criteria under which maritime zones may be 
established under UNCLOS.  By contrast to the purely negative 
statements produced throughout the protracted arbitration process, 
this is a positive statement of intent—not an intent to honor the 
award, but rather to avoid making claims that are plainly 
contradicted by it.  The White Paper marks a step toward a new 
agenda by spelling out the lawful bases of Chinese activities in 
these disputed waters in mostly recognizable legal terms. 
Indeed, the White Paper goes to great lengths to spell out the basis 
under a distinctive interpretation of UNCLOS for China’s rights 
and jurisdiction.  This argument is complemented by one of the 
more abundant official recitations of evidence documenting the 
accretion of Chinese authority over the islands and maritime 
spaces “in the long course of history . . . as early as the 2nd century 
BCE in the Western Han Dynasty.”103  This history-trumps-law 
tack is not new, but represents a decisive break from prior 
statements, which do not articulate the specific evidence China 
believes to be dispositive in the case.  It also marks the beginning 
of an ongoing groundswell in academic research on various arcane 
subjects in the law of the sea, especially historic rights and 
archipelagic waters, in which Chinese experts endeavor to identify 
the indeterminacies and gaps in UNCLOS that might be exploited 
by clever Chinese legal claims to expand the aperture for the 
exercise of rights and jurisdiction. 
A prominent example came in an article, published the following 
week in the military’s flagship newspaper, which begins with a 
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categorical statement of the insufficiency of UNCLOS: 
“UNCLOS did not provide rules for the issue of territorial sea 
baselines for continental countries’ archipelagos; nor did it 
provide rules for historic rights, although it affirmed their status in 
international law.”104  The authors, led by the Deputy Director of 
the Chinese Communist Party’s influential Central Party School, 
Wang Jumin, go on to suggest that China’s historic rights claims 
have been horribly misconstrued by the Award and can be easily 
reconciled with international law because they do not amount to 
an exclusive claim to economic rights within the waters of the 
South China Sea.  They begin to parse the various types of rights 
that are possible, including navigational rights, fishing rights, and 
law enforcement rights, then go some way towards articulating 
how China can use archipelagic baselines to claim some of these.  
Subsequent Chinese scholarship has picked up some of these 
themes and run with them.  Some of these efforts undertake in an 
exhaustive analysis of the practices of other states to suggest that 
there is indeed a precedent for claims, such as those to a 
“geographic unity” composed of tiny islets, reefs and rocks, that 
could justify some kind of “archipelagic baseline” claim.105  These 
are all efforts that bear close scrutiny, representing clear examples 
of China’s commitment to generating new customary international 
norms through consistent practice.  
In forwarding such creative interpretations at the seams in 
UNCLOS III, Chinese authors are trying to socialize their foreign 
counterparts to some plausible new norms.  The mere fact that 
these ideas are originating in China, with Chinese scholars 
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attempting to socialize the rest of the world to them, is an epochal 
change to the past pattern.  At least one of these efforts has even 
been applauded for representing partial “compliance” with the 
award:106 PRC’s concession to Filipino fishermen’s “traditional 
fishing activities” around the Scarborough Shoal.  Given that 
China is increasingly seeking to characterize its own fishing 
activities as “traditional fishing rights” (as in the “southwest 
fishing grounds” in the area near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands),107 
there are reasons to view this limited concession as an attempt to 
establish a precedent for fishing in the territorial seas and other 
jurisdictional waters of neighboring states.  That the Chinese 
Coast Guard has maintained a close cordon on the shoal and can 
unilaterally reverse this limited concession to the Philippines 
should also be borne in mind.  Already the tenuous nature of this 
“compliance” is evident: Philippine vessels have been prohibited 
from operating near the shoal during PRC’s unilateral summer 
fishing moratorium.108 
Since the award, the thrust of PRC diplomatic efforts in Southeast 
Asia has been to re-introduce the “charm” into the once-vaunted 
“charm offensive” it mounted in the region in the mid-2000s.109  
One of the central themes of this newly gracious approach has 
been the swift conclusion of a “Code of Conduct” for the South 
China Sea disputes, the long-awaited and perhaps legally-binding 
culmination of the effort commenced with the 2002 DOC.  One of 
the proposals being socialized by Chinese diplomats is for parties 
to forego any discussion of areas within the twelve nautical miles 
territorial seas of the features, and treat all the areas beyond those 
zones as some sort of common pool resource with a joint 
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development scheme for fisheries and hydrocarbons.110  Such 
innovative proposals illustrate the creative energy PRC is now 
devoting to shaping the law of the sea regime to suit its interests 
and is doing so with some clear, substantive goals in mind.  That 
these discussions have proceeded without the other claimants 
being able to insist on rigorous adherence to the award is a distinct 
signal that alternative norms and values are viable in this region.  
China’s exponentially greater capacity to use and administer 
resources under any such agreement guarantees that any joint 
management of these areas will be dominated by Chinese vessels 
and aircraft, and likely managed by Chinese firms. 
IV: International Law Is Dead!  Long Live International Law! 
What are the legal and political consequences of this action for 
China, for UNCLOS, for international dispute resolution, and for 
international law?  Beijing’s implicit goal was to undermine this 
specific arbitration and deter future unwelcome legal infringement 
on what China considers to be its sovereign prerogatives.  The 
central lines of PRC efforts have been to reframe the case as an 
instance of deliberate abuse of UNCLOS in service of political 
aims, to minimize the scope of issues on which UNCLOS is treated 
as the authoritative set of rules and norms, and to promote bilateral 
diplomatic alternatives to third-party dispute resolution.  If these 
positions were to gain broad international acceptance, the upshot 
would be a radical diminution of the effectiveness of ocean 
governance under the law of the sea regime.  Is there a different, 
Chinese-preferred mode of ocean governance apparent in this 
strategy?  Or is there simply a reversion to the diverse domestic 
laws and practices of coastal states, untethered from onerous 
international legal obligations? 
At present, only preliminary judgments are possible about the 
effects of the arbitration and China’s extraordinary actions to 
undermine it.  The overarching question concerns the influence 
China will have over the law of the sea regime, and maritime 
order generally, as it seeks to press forward with its maritime 
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claims in the wake of a ruling that profoundly discredits some of 
the key pillars on which they stand.  Three concluding 
observations stand out as appropriate for our consideration at 
present. 
First, the sheer volume of diplomatic efforts devoted to 
pronouncing China to be the state properly upholding UNCLOS 
and international law should be sufficient to indicate that Beijing 
has no intention of entirely discarding the law of the sea regime.  
Rather, we observe a far more subtle process of selectively 
adopting elements of UNCLOS III and forging them with 
elements of China’s domestic law and policy.  This process 
amounts to “creeping jurisdiction,” wherein the steady 
accumulation of domestic laws and practices in zones with hazily 
defined rights and jurisdiction can lead to a net increase in coastal 
state authority over those maritime zones.  By rejecting the 
arbitral proceeding but, paradoxically, wrapping itself in the 
mantle of international law, China is charting a course in which its 
participation—at scale and with defined goals based on its 
interests—can shape the way other states practice UNCLOS.  
How this has transpired is a question left open to future research, 
though it bears noting that many of the states along the Asian 
littoral share some Chinese views about coastal state authority 
(albeit not the nine-dashed line) that the United States deems to be 
“excessive maritime claims.”111 
China’s views on coastal state authority need not become 
recognized as a global norm for them to bring about systemic 
effects.  It would be sufficient for other states to simply acquiesce 
to a regional custom (perhaps one authorized in a code of conduct, 
though not necessarily).  Such an outcome would not immediately 
undermine UNCLOS, but would radically degrade its uniformity 
across the world’s oceans.  However grudging, international 
acceptance of a special set of Chinese excessive claims would 
create a precedent for other states and regional groupings to 
develop non-uniform practices.  It would become more difficult 
for courts or arbitral panels to deny the validity of plural 
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interpretations of important norms.  Such fragmentation of the 
global law of the sea regime may already be underway, a 
countervailing tendency to the ambitious dreams of UNCLOS 
drafters to realize a “constitution for the oceans.” 
At present, the Chinese alternative is not fully recognizable 
because it is limited to the region and inextricably bound up with 
maritime disputes that do not exist elsewhere.  Still, China is 
actively marketing its version of sea law to many states outside of 
the North Atlantic.  Many would not quickly sacrifice other 
economic and political interests—over which China has growing 
interest—for the sake of upholding a liberal and relatively open 
maritime domain.  China has shown considerable deftness (if not 
subtlety) in its coercive economic statecraft,112 and it is hardly 
speculative to expect that such disincentives could be presented to 
states that resist.  Beijing’s ready invocation of “sovereignty” as a 
means to diminish the penetration of international norms into the 
domestic sphere has considerable appeal in states throughout the 
developing world, especially those with non-democratic 
governments. 
This hyper-sovereigntist cause was initially weak during the post-
cold war era, a period in which a relatively liberal mode of 
interpreting major international conventions like UNCLOS was in 
ascendance.  However, the PRC is increasingly sophisticated and 
motivated in its attempts to establish norms that will permit states 
to carve out greater autonomy within an international system that 
has evolved to provide legal justification for universal jurisdiction 
in a variety of domains, from humanitarian interventions, to 
human rights, to environmental protection and conservation. 
Second, much has been made of China’s vested interest in free 
navigation throughout the South China Sea.  Because of its heavy 
trade dependence and concentration of major commercial centers 
on its far eastern periphery, China is uniquely vulnerable to trade 
disruptions and unlikely to support any systemic restrictions on 
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maritime traffic.  The fact that some 90% of global trade transits 
via maritime routes, however, is no bar on China’s efforts to 
promote a less liberal interpretation of the law of the sea regime.  
The norms that underpin this system—namely, a deference to user 
state rights over those of coastal states and a presumption that 
navigation is free in the absence of recognized jurisdiction—are 
neither inevitable nor immutable.  Even if China is 
disproportionately dependent on its maritime trade and certainly 
has no interest in a global constriction of container and tanker 
traffic, there is also no a priori reason to think China will not 
continue to press its local advantages to control and administer all 
navigation in its “near seas.”  The impressive expansion of 
China’s coast guard capacity and the global reach of the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy are among the sources of power that China 
can employ to limit its vulnerability.  Arguably, China’s primary 
vulnerability is to American sea power, so carving out some legal 
restrictions on U.S. navy access appears to be a cheap and dirty 
way to achieve some of this security without engaging in full-on 
confrontation.  
It is a past due observation that China has not been socialized into 
thinking that the existing order is the best order.  If Chinese 
maritime capabilities continue to advance, as seems highly likely, 
commercial navigation can remain unfettered while other areas of 
user state rights and interests are restricted (e.g., resource 
exploitation, military navigation, scientific research).  This would 
be a non-uniform and perhaps dysfunctional evolution in the law 
of the sea regime, as there is neither Chinese capacity nor intent to 
defend other states’ interests in similarly asserting coastal state 
rights.  Based on the current trajectory, Chinese influence appears 
to be diminishing the relative importance of global norms 
embodied in treaties and elevating the priorities of individual 
sovereigns to interpret UNCLOS according to their rights and to 
seek to control and administer maritime space in line with their 
domestic law. 
Finally, this arbitration is not the final Chinese statement on legal 
dispute resolution.  While there are few reasons to think PRC will 
abandon a long-standing principle of preferring bilateral 
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“negotiation and consultation” to third party adjudication, there 
are many reasons to think it is adaptive.  The case of China’s 
practice in WTO dispute resolution is one example, though 
perhaps inapposite because the large volume of relatively trivial 
cases in that arena do not resemble the large, and (arguably) 
sovereignty-related stakes of maritime arbitration.  Nonetheless, 
there are a host of UNCLOS issues on which China has relatively 
minor disputes with neighbors on which China may consent to 
arbitration, if only to shore up its status as a good faith party to 
UNCLOS.  Challenging Japan’s claim to an EEZ and continental 
shelf surrounding Okino-tori is one possibility proposed by some 
Chinese law of the sea specialists. 
Alternatively, China has already dealt a major blow to the 
institution’s functionality.  If awards can be easily sloughed off, 
and further, denigrated as unlawful themselves, there may be a 
chilling effect on other attempts to launch arbitral processes.  This 
single case will not be fatal for the efficacy of that mechanism, but 
it establishes a precedent that may become corrosive in the event 
of other suits against China.  It also goes towards explaining some 
of the “dogs that don’t bark”—namely, Vietnam’s reluctance to 
seek arbitration on similar issues in its disputes with China in the 
South China Sea.  If fewer states believe that legal dispute 
resolution mechanisms can be used effectively, they will wither.  
Less dramatically, if China has established a higher bar for 
jurisdiction and admissibility of cases that plausibly touch on 
maritime delimitation, the compulsory dispute system may simply 
fall into relative disuse. 
The Chinese response to the South China Sea arbitration has set 
an important, if still uncertain, precedent for future practice.  
Backed up by impressive capacity and enabled by a less robust 
international legal environment that lacks energetic American 
enforcement of key norms, China is primed to externalize its 
distinctive approach to international law into the wider 
international legal arena.  We should remain highly attuned to 
China’s subsequent practice as it bears on the South China Sea 
arbitral award, and perhaps even more so to the ways in which its 
practices influence those of other states in the region and beyond. 
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